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Comments
Marvin v. Marvin: The Scope of Equity with
Respect to Non-Marital Relationships
INTRODUCTION
The practice of illicit cohabitation, otherwise referred to as a
meretricious relationship, seems to be a practice that is on the
rise', providing couples with an alternative to the traditional
concepts of a marital union2. In California, the law had been in a
state of flux with conflicting precedents guiding the course of
such legally unrecognized relationships 3. Recently, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court stepped into the conflict and rendered Mar-
vin v. Marvin4, a declaration of principles by which the distribu-
tion of property acquired in a non-marital relationship should
be governed.
1. "The 1970 census figures indicate that today perhaps eight times as
many couples are living together without being married as cohabitated ten
years ago." See, In re Cary: A Judicial Recognition of Illicit Cohabitation, 25
HASTINGS L.J. 1226 (1974).
2. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4100 (West 1970) prescribed the definition and require-
ments for a valid marriage which will be recognized by the State .... "Mar-
riage is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract, to which the consent of
the parties capable of making that contract is necessary. Consent alone will not
constitute marriage; it must be followed by the issuance of a license and solem-
nization as authorized by this code ... " In addition, CAL. CIv. CODE § 4100-4209
(West 1970) explain the requirements and procedures necessary for a valid
marriage.
3. In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973), and
Estate of Atherley, 44 Cal. App. 3d 758,119 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1975), have held that the
Family Law Act (Civ. Code, §§ 4000-5000 (West 1970)) requires division of the
property according to community property principles, and Beckman v. May-
hew, 49 Cal. App. 3d 529, 122 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1975) has rejected that holding.
4. 18 C.3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1977).
Although basic guidelines are set forth, the Court has depart-
ed from the traditional meretricious-putative scheme of analy-
sis 5 and has adopted, instead, a strict contract approach to-
wards the resolution of disputes over ownership of property
acquired during illicit cohabitation.
Absent from the Court's analysis is the place or status of such
a relationship within the Family Law Act framework. While in
the beginning of its opinion the Court dismissed the Family Law
Act 6 as a guide for the distribution of property during a non-
marital relationship7 , the Court in its use of "Contract analysis"
basically relied on an equitable treatment of the issue of distri-
bution, although the basis for the use of equity was not de-
lineated. What was more startling was the elaboration by the
Court of alternative remedies that could be employed in future
situations based upon this "Contract" formula.
In its attempt to do justice, the Court may have created a
judicial monster outside the purview of the Family Law Act in
which non-marital spouses have greater rights than those of
lawfully-wedded couples who have chosen to cohabitate under
the recognized law. An established judicial and social policy is
that of promoting the institution of marriage8, a policy that must
be presumed still in force in the Marvin decision; however, the
effect of that decision may have just the opposite effect ... a
new system outside the purview of community property princi-
ples in which the effects of cohabitation plus "business" con-
tracts provide the one spouse with more protection than that of
a legally-recognized spouse 9 upon the dissolution of marriage or
death of a spouse.
5. Coats v. Coats, 160 Cal. 671, 118 P. 441 (1911); Oakley v. Oakley, 82 Cal.
App. 2d 188, 185 P.2d 848 (1947). If there is no valid legal marriage between the
spouses, there is not the requisite "community" for community property pur-
poses. However, case law and CAL. CIV. CODE § 4401 (West 1970) and § 4452 (West
Supp. 1977) have provided protection for those spouses who are deemed "puta-
tive" spouses-those who believed in good faith that they were validly married
but, in fact, were not. However, where both parties had knowledge of the in-
validity of their living relationship, the courts did not grant relief unless the
party requesting relief had contributed funds to the acquisition of property.
Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 685 134 P.2d 761, 763 (1962).
6. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4000-5000 (West 1970).
7. A non-marital relationship is hereinafter defined as a relationship be-
tween a man and a woman in which both indefinitely take on the assumption of
family life without a marriage ceremony and without any of the formalities
which the California Civil Code sets forth to define a legally-recognized mar-
riage, but which ostensibly represents a husband and wife relationship.
8. Deyoe v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. 476, 482, 74 P. 28, 30 (1903).
9. As will be further illustrated in the paper, a non-married spouse by
making contracts that are independent of one another and each resting on
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The scope of this note will examine the inadequacies of the
Marvin decision, in terms of balancing the interests of the man,
the woman and the state in this "Contract relationship", to re-
examine the social policy attempting to be fostered, and to sug-
gest a more equitable system which would be implemented by
using the Family Law Act in conjunction with new social policy
guidelines. This scheme would institute a more predictable and
just remedial pattern for the distribution of assets acquired
during non-marital relationships.
THE STATUS OF THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF
NON-MARRIED COHABITATORS BEFORE MARVIN
The status of unmarried cohabitators' property rights was in
a state of confusion prior to the Marvin decision 0 . The Courts
of Appeal had voiced two" divergent opinions regarding the
issue in the cases of In Re Marriage of Cary12 and Beckman v.
Mayhew 13 .
In Cary, the Court recognized the pervasiveness of the no-
fault concept of the Family Law Act 14 . As stated in the opinion
"The equal division of community property was one of the ways
of advancing (the Act's) no-fault philosophy."1 5 The Court inter-
preted Civil Code Section 4452 as, in a sense, eliminating the
"guilty party" theory of a putative relationship' 6. By contending
separate consideration or, on the other hand, making one contract with provi-
sions for relief greater than the relief given in a legally-recognized marital
union, the non-married spouse could possibly achieve more benefits than the
"legal spouse".
10. See note 3, supra.
11. Estate of Atherley, 44 Cal. App. 3d 758, 119 Cal. Rptr. 41(1975) will not be
included in this analysis becuase the case states basically the same principles as
In Re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973).
12. 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973).
13. 49 Cal. App. 3d 529, 122 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1975).
14. 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 350, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862, 864 (1973). The Court states
that "the basic substantive change in the law (brought about by the Family Law
Act) is the elimination of fault or guilt as grounds for granting or denying a
divorce and for refusing alimony and making an unequal division of community
property."
15. Id. at 351, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 865 (1973). In addition, the Court reiterated
that the policy behind the Act is so strong that in CAL. CIv. CODE § 4509 (West
1976) the legislature specifically provided that in family law proceedings relat-
ing to property rights, any pleading or proof relating to misconduct, or "guilt",
or "innocence" of a party "shall be improper and inadmissible."
16. Id. at 351-2, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 865 (1973). "An analysis of CAL. CIv. CODE §
4452 (West Supp. 1977) discloses that where one party to a non-marital family
that both parties are "guiltless" a perfect analogy to unmarried
co-habitators becomes apparent. The concept of the "guilt" of
both parties elucidated in Keene v. Keene17, was abolished in
Cary if one threshhold step was met. The step was that ". . .not
only must an ostensible marital relationship exist, but also an
actual family relationship, with cohabitation and mutual recog-
nition and assumption of the usual rights, duties, and obliga-
tions attending marriage."' 18 What the Court essentially did was
to adopt by analogy Civil Code Section 4452, buttressed by Civil
Code Sections 450919 and 480020, with respect to couples living
relationship in bad faith knew of the marriage's infirmity or nonexistence, and
the other did not, the Act neither penalizes nor rewards the respective parties
upon a judicial division of their accumulated property. The party who in bad
faith brought about the pseudo-marriage is not for that reason left where found
by the court. Nor may any guilt or innocence of the parties in theiir relationship
after entering the illegitimate union be considered by the court. Sections 4452,
4509 and 4800 assure that the parties, without punishment or reward to either,
shall receive an equal division of that which would have been community pro-
perty had they been validly married."
17. 57 Cal. 2d 657,371 P.2d 329, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1962) the Court adopted the
same type of reasoning as did the Court in Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681,134
P.2d 761 (1943) where it stated, "Equitable considerations arising from the rea-
sonable expectation of the continuation of benefits attending the status of mar-
riage entered into in good faith are not present in such a case." Id. at 685, 134
P.2d at 763. Also, in Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich, 88 Cal. App. 2d 708, 200 P.2d 49
(1948) the Court in trying a case which involved a woman being classified as a
putative spouse and gaining relief based upon household services rendered to
husband while she was under the belief that her marriage was valid and then at
a later time finding out that the marriage had been deemed invalid by reason of
a divorce decree, being denied relief on the theory "... that after August 10,
1945, plaintiff was no longer an innocent, deluded, putative wife ... the rela-
tionship between the parties was meretricious after October 1, 1945 .... The
equitable considerations arising from the reasonable expectation of a continua-
tion of benefits attending the status of marriage entered into in good faith which
had existed prior ... did not exist thereafter." Id. at 718, 719, 200 P.2d at 55, 56.
These three cases exemplify the strict approach that the Courts took in
evaluating whether equitable considerations were to be present. The natural
tendency of the Court was to equate meretricious with the word guilt and then to
infer a non-equitable circumstance, whereas putative was a word that connoted
the good faith of the party.
18. In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 353, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862, 865,
866 (1973). It should be pointed out that the criteria for application of the rule
(that of equal division of the property-adopted from CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800
(West Supp. 1977)) is much more than that of an unmarried living arrangement
between a man and a woman. The concept is that of mutual recognition by the
parties that rights, duties, and obligations flow between the parties binding
them to a "relationship".
19. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4509 (West Supp. 1977). The section essentially states
the policy of the Family Law Act, that of no-fault dissolution. Section 4509
accomplishes this goal by disallowing any evidence of specific acts of miscon-
duct.
20. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1977). The section governs the distri-
bution of community and quasi-community property and by authority of CAL.
CIv. CODE § 4452 (West Supp. 1977) prescribes an equal division of quasi-marital
property.
52
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together without the solemnization of the state of marriage.
Although the Court did not use the term quasi-marital proper-
ty 21 in terms of dividing the property equally, it used the formu-
la of Civil Code Section 4800 in the division, rationalizing that "it
is within the equitable jurisdiction of the Court to rule even in
the presence of a statutory authority."
Conversely, in Beckman v. Mayhew 2 , a more recent case, the
Court shied away from the reasoning of the Cary Court stating
that the legislature did not ever intend to abrogate the Vallera-
Keene2 3 rule when it adopted the Family Law Act. "Neither",
the Court went on to say, "in terms nor by implication does it
(the Family Law Act) deal with non-marital family relationships
of the kind involved in Vallera, Keene, and... (Beckman).' 24
The Beckman Court re-adopted the Vallera approach stating
that the female party gains no interest in property acquired by
the man and woman, unless there is an express agreement to
pool earnings and share equally in their joint accumulations or,
in the absence of such agreement, the woman would be entitled
to a share in the property jointly accumulated in the proportion
that her funds contributed toward its acquisition.2 5
It should also be noted that the Beckman, Keene, and Cary
Courts did not assimilate the word "funds" with the word "serv-
21. Quasi-marital property is defined in CAL. CIV. CODE § 4452 (West Supp.
1977) as property acquired during the union which would have been community
or quasi-community property if the union had not been void or voidable.
22. 49 Cal. App. 3d 529, 122 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1975).
23. The Vallera-Keene rule is a four part statement which states that:
(1) the female partner (or the male partner, whichever is the claiming
party) gains no interest in a meretricious relationship; the Court
not finding equity in such a circumstance;.
(2) at its termination, the spouse claiming an interest from such a
relationship is entitled to share in the accumulated assets only if
there has been an express agreement to pool funds;
(3) in the absence of agreement, for the spouse claiming an interest
she must have contributed funds toward the acquisition of the
property;
(4) there shall be no monetary credit for domestic services rendered;
in other words, domestic services performed are not funds in the
sense of "contribution of funds" to help acquire property.
24. The type of relationship being referred to is a (meritricious) non-marital
relationship in which the claiming spouse has not contributed "funds" toward
acquisition of property during the relationship; however, in each (non-marital
relationship) the female spouse had contributed some type of domestic services
to the relationship.
25. See note 24, supra.
ices", an essential element in 'each of the cases. In each, the
female partner had contributed domestic services in part or in
whole to the "relationship" 26. Thus, the unanimity in approach
between the two apparently diverse positions focused on one
specific area of agreement, the principle that the domestic serv-
ices of the female partner were not considered contributions for
purposes of acquisition of property between a man and a
woman.
Also, one should be aware that in the two cases which sup-
posedly set guidelines, the fact patterns triggered different ap-
proaches to the concept of so-called meretricious relationships.
In Cary, the man and woman externally manifested to the
world through their conducted business activities 27 that they
were husband and wife28. They established, according to Cary,
an "actual family relationship" which consisted of cohabitation
and mutual recognition and assumption of the usual rights,
duties and obligations attending marriage29.
However, in Beckman, the parties did not represent openly a
"family relationship"; moreover, they made no pretense of a
marital status 30 . Even though their business dealings were mix-
ed, they only used the marital status for their personal benefit
and did not assume any of the duties and obligations that flow
from the marital union. The equity-laden Court with that set of
26. Beckman v. Mayhew, 49 Cal. App. 3d 529, 533, 122 Cal. Rptr. 604, 606
(1975) Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 686, 134 P.2d 761 (1943). Justice Curtis in
his dissent intimates that the wife therein had contributed "the value of her
services as housekeeper, cook and homemaker. ... Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d
657, 669, 371 P.2d 329,336, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593, 600 (1962). Justice Peters states in the
Keene dissent that during the period from 1938 to 1956, the plaintiff, [the
woman] "managed the household and performed all the customary duties of a
housewife."
27. The term business activities for purposes herein refers to transactions
such as filing of a joint tax return, holding a joint checking account, signing
negotiable paper as husband and wife, taking out a loan as husband and wife,
etc. In other words, the financial representations of the man and woman outside
the home and in non-social settings were that of legally wedded spouses.
28. In addition to holding themselves out as husband and wife in a business
transaction, supra note 26, the couple represented their status as husband and
wife in their social interactions with society.
29. See note 18 supra.
30. Beckman v. Mayhew, 49 Cal. App. 3d 529, 122 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1975). In
stating the federal backdrop of the case, the Court made note of the fact that if
the parties married, their marriage would have caused plaintiff to lose a govern-
ment pension of $200.00 to $230.00 per month. " ... In social matters the parties
made no pretense of marital status. In financial matters, they used their indi-
vidual last names for some purposes and used the man's last name for other
purposes .... ." In other words there was no consistency to their ostensible
manifestations with respect to their relationship. Id. at 532, 533, 122 Cal. Rptr. at
606, 607.
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facts before it, noticeably approached the problem from a dif-
ferent angle.
Thus, the facts of the two cases present an interesting blend of
social theories: Beckman, placed its emphasis on the promotion
of the institution of marriage while Cary developed the family
relationship test. This latter test focuses upon the manifestation
to the world of a husband-and-wife relationship and the former
uses upon the solemnization of such a relationship l. Although
the Beckman Court expressly rejected the Cary holding, still,
the basic social policy of the perpetuation of a husband-wife
relationship is evident. The significance of such an observation




The case involves a non-marital relationship that has ter-
minated. The notoriety and fame of the principals 3 adds that
much more magnification to an issue of great importance-that
is, the method by which the law will govern the distribution of
property acquired during a "non-marital relationship".
Plaintiff and defendant lived together for seven years without
entering into a marital union. Both parties knew that no mar-
riage did exist or had ever existed, thus ruling out the theory of
putative spouses 33 . During this period, all property acquired
was taken under defendant's name. Plaintiff, moreover, alleged
that both she and defendant entered into an oral contract that
stated that they would combine their efforts and earnings and
would share equally in all property accumulated as a result of
their efforts either individually or combined.
31. In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973).
"The criteria for application of the rule (with respect to unmarried living ar-
rangements between a man and a woman) [is] that there be established not only
an ostensible marital relationship but also an actual family relationship, with
cohabitation and mutual recognition and assumption of the usual rights, duties,
and obligations attending marriage." Id. at 353, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
32. Lee Marvin, an established star of motion pictures among them, Cat
Ballou, Paint Your Wagon, The Dirty Dozen, and numerous others.
33. A putative spouse is defined as one who in good faith honestly believes
to have contracted lawfully to marry and continue the relationship.
Further, plaintiff alleged that they did agree to hold them-
selves out to the general public as husband and wife and that
plaintiff would further render services as companion,
homemaker, housekeeper and cook to defendant3 4 . Plaintiff al-
so alleged that she agreed to give up a lucrative career as an
entertainer (singer) and in return defendant allegedly agreed to
provide for all of plaintiff's financial support and needs for the
rest of her life. During the period of cohabitation the parites
acquired a substantial amount of real and personal property,
including motion picture rights.
Thus, the basic issue in the case was to resolve the manner of
division of this property acquired during the relationship. Un-
like the preceding cases 35 which based their reasoning primarily
upon joint venture theory and contribution of funds, Marvin
borrowed contract language from Vallera v. Vallera36 and ex-
pounded a series of remedies based upon pure contract princi-
ples.
In holding that the plaintiff did have an express contract with
the defendant concerning their relationship and sustaining a
breach thereto, the Court elucidated at the outset of its opinion
its conclusions to govern distribution of property acquired in a
non-marital relationship. The Court concluded:3 7
(1) That the provisions of the Family Law Act do not govern the
distribution of property acquired during a non-marital relation-
ship; such a relationship remains subject to judicial decision;
(2) The Courts should enforce express contracts between non-marit-
al partners except to the extent that the contract is explicitly
founded on the consideration of meretricious sexual services;
(3) In the absence of an express contract, the Courts should inquire
into the conduct of the parties to determine whether that conduct
demonstrates an implied contract, agreement of partnership or
joint venture, or some other tacit understanding between the par-
ties; and,
(4) The Courts may also employ the doctrines of quantum meruit,
equitable remedies such as constructive or resulting trusts, when
warranted...
The Court's opinion, while at a glance seemingly a new ap-
proach to the problem of non-marital cohabitation, is really a
compilation of reasoning from primarily three sources: first, an
adaptation of the contract-type analysis in the majority opinion
34. Marvin v. Marvin, 16 Cal. 3d 660,666, 557 P.2d 106, 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815,
819 (1977) in the belief that a valid marriage exists.
35. Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 371 P.2d 329, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1962),
Beckman v. Mayhew, 49 Cal. App. 3d 529, 122 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1975).
36. 21 Cal. 29 681, 134 P.2d 761 (1943).
37. Marvin v. Marvin 18 Cal. 3d 660,665,557 P.2d 106, 110,134 Cal. Rptr. 815,
819 (1977). "
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of Vallera v. Vallera3 8, an opinion that had been narrowly con-
strued in cases to follow 39 but as readopted in Marvin, given a
broader construction to include express and implied contracts
in their pure sense, non-exclusive of the aspect of contribution
of funds;40 second, an emphasis on the dissenting opinion 8y Mr.
Justice Curtis expressing his view of inclusion of the contribu-
tion of domestic services in the definition of contribution of
funds to the community;41 thirdly, an emphasis on In Re Mar-
riage of Cary42 in that Court's application of equitable princi-
ples of distribution in a non-marital context.
Combined, the Marvin Court blends these distinct viewpoints
into a not so clear expression of the law with respect to division
of property in a non-marital relationship undergoing dissolu-
tion.
The opinion, while going a long way to create more equitable
treatment of the partners in an illicit cohabitation agreement,
has cut off the logical and equitable tie of the Family Law Act.
In so doing, the Court has made a dent in a social policy that it
has through the years been trying to foster, that of fostering
marriage43 . Instead of trying to work within the Family Law
38. 21 Cal. 2d 681, 134 P.2d 761 (1943).
39. Although the wording in Vallera rings with contract terminology, the
concept of application of the principles of express and implied contract were
not followed other than in cases where a party had contributed "funds", in the
sense of property or money towards acquisition of property.
The rule has been applied in a number of District Court of Appeal decisions
since Vallera [e.g., Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich, 88 Cal. App. 2d 708, 719,200 P.2d
49, 56 (1948); Baskett v. Crook, 86 Cal. App. 2d 355,361-362, 195 P.2d 39,43 (1943);
Oakley v. Oakley, 82 Cal. App. 2d 188, 190, 192, 185 P.2d 848, 849-50 (1947)] and
has recently been invoked by the highest courts of several sister jurisdictions
[e.g., Stevens v. Anderson 75 Ariz. 331, 256 P.2d 712, 715 (1953); Welmaker v.
Roberts, 213 Ga. 740, 101 S.E.2d 712, 713 (1958); Sparrow v. Sparrow, 231 La. 966,
93 So.2d 232, 234 (1957); Smith v. Smith, 255 Wis. 96, 38 N.W.2d 12, 14 (1949)].
It may be pointed out that in denying relief in cases of this nature the courts
have not discriminated against the woman, but have also rejected where appro-
priate, the claim of the man. [See, e.g., Gjurich v. Fieg, 164 Cal. 429, 129 P. 464
(1918); McQuin v. Rice, 88 Cal. App. 2d 914, 199 P.2d 742 (1948); Orth v. Wood, 354
Pa. 121, 47 A.2d 140 (1946); Wosche v. Kraming, 353 Pa. 481, 46 A.2d 220 (1946)].
40. In Marvin, the Court allowed the law of contract, i.e., methods of proof,
terms, conditions, etc. to pervade the context of non-marital living relationships,
not limited by the previous strict caveat of mandatory contribution of "funds" to
the acquisition of property during the period of the relationship.
41. In Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 685, 134 P.2d 761, 763 (1943) Mr.
Justice Curtis in his dissent equated contribution of domestic services by a
party as inclusive in the definition of "contributions of funds" to the community.
42. 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973).
43. See note 8, supra.
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Act, as provided by the Legislature, the Court has classified
non-marital relationships as ones outside the purview of the
Act, and has given them remedies based upon contract theory.
These remedies could possibly arrive at the same equitable re-
sult as would have been achieved using the Family Law Act as a
guide. However, the additional possibility exists that by careful-
ly constructing a complaint, one of the parties to the "relation-
ship" could be awarded a non-equal share in the property distri-
bution.44
In reviewing the decision, two points stand out to this author
as problem areas. First, the excising from consideration the
policy of the Family Law Act in dealing with non-marital rela-
tionships. Second, the statement of remedies enunciated by the
Court: whether they will adequately cover situations or whether
they will provide one spouse in a non-marital relationship with
an advantage over that of a legally-wedded spouse in a similar
position.
The institution of matrimony is said to be the foundation of
society, and a community at large has an interest in the mainte-
nance of its integrity and purity. In every civilized country,
marriage is recognized as the most important relation in life and
one in which the state is vitally interested. The public policy is to
foster and to protect it, to make it a permanent and public
institution, to encourage the parties to live together, and to pre-
vent separation 45 .
It must be assumed then, that this public policy still pervades
the law of this state. However, it is appropriate to ask, in light of
Marvin, whether that public policy is one that is outdated or one
that is in need of redefinition.
The Family Law Act's primary purpose is for the division of
property acquired by the parties under a marital relationship.
The Act embodies the basic theory for division of property, that
of community property46. From this theory which has survived
from its adoption in the Treaty of 184847, the new act has elimi-
44. For example, a spouse could allege that an oral contract existed where-
by the parties would each split one-half of the property acquired by each and
that the working spouse, in addition, would pay to the non-working spouse a
yearly salary for domestic services rendered.
45. See note 8, supra.
46. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1977).
47. Following the admission, in 1845, of the independent Republic of Texas
as a state in our federal union, the United States assumed the burden of the
boundary disputes existing between Texas and Mexico. At the outbreak of the
war in 1846, the U.S. immediately put under way plans for the conquest of
California. After seizure of the region by the U.S., the Treaty of Guadalupe
[Vol. 5: 49, 1977] The Scope of Equity
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nated the concept of fault or guilt as grounds for granting or
denying a divorce, for refusing alimony or making unequal
division of community property48.
Cary, in using the Family Law Act as a guidepost, spe'cifically
Civil Code Section 4452, brought community property princi-
ples into effect when an actual family relationship was found49.
Thus, by analogizing to the Family Law Act the two parties
living together were, in effect, being governed by community
property principles, which imposed upon them the rights and
duties peculiar to married persons 50 .
Thus, Cary took advantage of the statutory remedies as writ-
ten and made them governing law with respect to those persons
not adhering to the legal concept of marriage. The wisdom of
such an approach was twofold. First, in applying equitable prin-
ciples to the dissolution of a non-marital relationship, the Court
provided equitable relief while at the same time predicating
relief upon the desirable social policy of promoting the family
unit. The jurisdiction of the Court is not diminished when by
statutory change some rights cease to exist, and certain cases
which Courts of Equity once entertained can no longer arise.
The equity power of the courts was not intended as a limitation
Hidalgo in 1848 confirmed this possession. Under the treaty, civil authority was
in the hands of the military which adopted the "laws of California" not inconsis-
tent with the laws, constitution, and treaties of the United States. It is clear that
the former existing law, which included the community property system, was
recognized and continued by the proper governmental authority during this
period between conquest of California and the taking effect of its constitution
and admission as a state. Further, in the Constitution of California written in
1849, Art. XI § 14 shows conclusively that it was the intention of its authors to
adopt the Spanish system of community property. W. DE. FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF
COMMUNITY PROPERTY, 106-109 (1st ed. 1943).
48. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4509 (West Supp. 1977).
49. See note 18, supra.
50. These rights and duties imposed upon the parties in a nonmarital rela-
tionship are only meant to connote rights and duties with respect to the govern-
ing of distribution of property. In Miller, The Return of Common Law Marriage
to California, Vol. 8, No. 2 J. BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASSOCIATION 19 (1974), the
author states that if the Cary ruling is followed "once an actual family relation-
ship is established, all of the provisions of the Family Law Act applicable to
such a relationship could well apply, including, for example, orders for spousal
support and the like. . . ." It should be noted that by no means does this article
represent the same type of far-reaching analogistic approach as presented in the
Journal quotation, supra. The context and the extent of the analysis is limited to
property division and establishing equitable guidelines thereto.
upon the power to legislate upon the rights of persons5 1 . Second,
the Court left itself with code sections and case law from which
to analogize when faced with more complex problems 52 regard-
ing dissolutions of non-marital relationships. Therefore, while
the legislature did not expressly provide its policy on the issue
of non-marital division of property acquired during the rela-
tionship, the Court, sitting in its equitable capacity can infer and
adopt equitable principles from the Act and integrate them into
case-made law based upon equitable considerations.
Marvin took non-marital relationships out of the Family Law
Act background and placed over them a veil of contract law.
53
It is a well-settled principle reiterated in the Marvin decision
that non-marital partners may lawfully contract concerning the
ownership of the property acquired during the relationship5 4 .
So too, married persons can contract with respect to the proper-
ty acquired during the marriage or with respect to their indi-
vidual, separate property 55 . However, in the cases that the Mar-
vin Court cites, the property contracts either express or im-
plied-in-fact were distinct and applied to specific pieces of pro-
perty5 6. Conversely, what is proposed in the decision is express
and implied-in fact contracts affecting all the property ac-
quired during the relationship. Thus, the focus shifts con-
siderably in the "contract analysis" from whether the contract
51. Modern Barber College v. California Employment Stabilization Com-
mission, 31 Cal. 2d 720, 192 P.2d 916 (1948). The case presented the problem of
whether a writ of mandamus, an equitable remedy, could be issued in the face of
a statutory remedy expressly governing the situation. The Court in holding in
the negative did, however, in its dicta, consider the situation where the Legisla-
ture has spoken but has not covered the issue in question specifically. Such is
the situation here, where a Court has the power under its equitable jurisdiction
to provide a remedy for the specific cause at issue before it.
A similar sentiment existed in Estate of Barnett, 97 Cal. App. 138, 275 P. 453
(1928). In addition, where the subject is of judicial origin, and there is no statute
which purports to cover the subject comprehensively and definitely, the subject
area is more susceptible to change by judicial action. 1 C. DALLAS SANDS,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 59-62 (4th ed. 1972). [Note: there is no
Section in the California Civil Code that deals with the issue of property division
in a non-marital relationship.]
52. The reference to "more complex problems" does not intimate any prob-
lems beyond the scope of property division between the parties.
53. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal.3d 660,665,557 P.2d 106,110, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815,
819 (1977). The case expressly states that "the provisions of the Family Law Act
do not govern the distribution of property acquired during a non-marital rela-
tionship." This strong wording infers that the entire act together with its policy
are to be cast away when dealing with non-marital relationships.
54. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1977).
55. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4802 and 5107-8 (West 1970).
56. Trutalli v. Meraviglia, 215 Cal. 698, 12 P.2d 430 (1932), and Vallera v.
Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 134 P.2d 761 (1943).
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is to be interpreted in the narrow sense as affecting particular
pieces of property to whether the contract is to be one affecting
the bounds of a relationship. Clearly, the Court in Marvin v.
Marvin5 7 advocates the imposition of contract law to effect the
latter. In taking such an approach without defining precisely
the social policy and the bounds of equity involved, the Court
has exposed itself to numerous possible attacks and situations
which will inevitably increase the congestion of the courts, and
its impact strikes at the law both with respect to non-marital
relationships as well as to marriages consummated under the
authority of the State58.
III
PROMOTING AND FOSTERING OSTENSIBLE RELATIONSHIPS
VERSUS PROMOTING AND FOSTERING THE INSTITUTION
OF MARRIAGE:
A New Social Policy
In focusing upon the remedies proposed in Marvin v. Mar-
vin 59 and their general applicability to non-marital relation-
ships, it is important to discover the social policy being fostered
so that the remedies proposed can be applied by the courts in a
consistent and equitable manner.
However, Marvin's basic problem is that it does not delineate
any social policy grounds for its ruling60 and by precluding
application of the Family Law Act has discarded its scope of
equity in which to function 61.
For relief to be granted to a petitioning non-married partner,
must there be a solemnized marriage as fostered in Beckman v.
57. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1970).
58. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 4100-4104 (West 1970) state the requirements for a
valid marriage in the State of California.
59. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1977).
60. Id. at 683, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831. Even though the Court
recognized the social policy of fostering and promoting the institution of valid
marriages, the Court stated that equitable considerations are paramount, but
did not delineate what the status of the above-mentioned policy is.
61. Id. at 681, 557 P.2d at 120, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 829. The Court makes the
assertion that there is no reason to believe the legislature intended the Family
Law Act to effect the relationship between non-marital partners; however, by
such an assertion, the Court also rules out the possibility of analogizing to the
"Act" to define more precisely the scope of the equitable remedies.
Mayhew 2 , or an "actual family relationship" consisting of the
spouses appearing to be husband and wife as advocated in
Cary.63 Or is it necessary to formulate a new social policy em-
phasizing the family as made up of two individuals, a man and a
woman, who do not necessarily "label themselves" to the world
as husband and wife per se, but do contribute to a "community
of interest" 64 accepting the rights and duties of a family?
The Marvin Court struggles with and rejects the Beckman-
type approach when it states that although it recognizes the
public policy to foster the institution of marriage 65, at the same
time it could not tolerate judicial rules which result in an in-
equitable division of property.
In Cary, the Appellate Court predicated relief upon meeting
the family relationship test 66. However, one must ponder what
really is the test in Cary. Is the test of this ostensible family
relationship the representation of the parties as husband and
wife to the community at large in the form of their business and
social contexts? Such a limited view of the test could be support-
ed by the facts in the Cary case itself67 and by the already
existing social policy of fostering the institution of marriage.
Because the Cary Court did not address itself to the issue of the
prevailing social policy, it can be arguably presumed that the
Court incorporated the existing social policy of promoting and
fostering the institution of marriage and extended the concept
to non-marital relationships when the parties hold themselves
out as husband and wife.
Still, Marvin's remedies do not seem so constrained and lim-
ited68 .
A third alternative that no Court has yet espoused, but
within which the Marvin decision could function is a new social
62. 49 Cal. App. 3d 529, 122 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1975).
63. See note 31, supra.
64. As used in this paper, the term "community of interest" refers to the
acts by which the parties in a non-marital relationship contribute to the survival
of the relationship, whether it be in terms of money, services, etc., in the attempt
to preserve the relationship and which are not solely based on sexual con-
sideration.
65. See note 60, supra.
66. See note 31, supra.
67. 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973). The facts of the case were
basically that the two parties held themselves out as husband and wife in their
business transactions and social functions. This is in direct contrast to a rela-
tionship where the parties live together contributing to the continuation of the
relationship but at the same time retain their identity as individuals (not as
partners) in their outward manifestations to the outside world.
68. See note 60, supra.
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policy emphasizing a family relationship not constrained by an
ostensible labels as in Cary, but viewed in a context of an overt
intent to contribute in some way to a "community of interest" in
a non-marital relationship. Anything less than an intentional
and overt attempt to keep all the property separate would result
in the court acknowledging this as a family relationship and
thus imposing upon the parties the rights and duties imposed
upon married individuals subject to the Family Law Act.
Such a view would:
1-promote the concept of establishing family relation-
ships because the parties would know that the effect of living
together in a non-marital union would not be different from
living together under the solemnization of the State69 ;
2-provide for a more equitable scope of division of the
property since neither party could effectively take advantage of
the other; and,
3-provide the court with a defined scope with respect to
granting relief under express as well as implied contracts and
see to the fact that non-marital relationships are not placed in a
more favored position than marital relationships with respect to
the division of property.
The Remedies Of Express And Implied Contract
The ramifications of an express contract as in the Marvin
case, whose terms consisted of clauses regarding division of
property acquired during the relationship and a provision
granting the non-working spouse support "for the rest of her
life, ' 70 provide the easiest of situations in which to apply the
69. The indirect result of such an imposition of rights and duties is to begin
a relationship with the given fact that obligations will arise with respect to a
communal living arrangement.
70. This wording when taken in the context of a marital union would pre-
sumptively mean that the working spouse would provide for the monetary
support of the nonworking spouse during the marriage. In the event of dissolu-
tion, the Court under CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4351 and 4801 (West Supp. 1977) would
have the power "to order a party to pay for the support of the other party... for
such period of time, as the Court may deem just and reasonable having regard
for the circumstances of the respective parties, including the duration of the
marriage, and the ability of the supported spouse to engage in gainful employ-
ment without interfering with the interests of the children of the parties in the
custody of such spouse .. " CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801 (West Supp. 1977).
Marvin remedies 71.
That "non-marital partners may lawfully contract concerning
the ownership of property acquired during the relationship 72
cannot be quarreled with on contract grounds. The Court fur-
ther substantiates that a contract between non-marital partners,
even if expressly made in contemplation of a common living
arrangement, is invalid only if sexual services form an insepar-
able part of the consideration for the agreement 7 .
In the present case, the defendant admitted entering into the
contract, thereby leaving himself open to the express contract
analysis and remedial provisions for breach 74.
Ponder, however, the situation where the other spouse denies
that a contract did exist, or alternatively that a contract did
exist but that the parties specifically agreed not to be bound by
any legal obligations during the relationship to each other and,
in the event of dissolution, that each person's property would
remain separate.
Thus, we must proceed to the Marvin Court's second sugges-
tion that in the absence of an express contract, the Court should
inquire into the conduct of the parties to determine whether that
conduct demonstrates an implied contract, agreement or part-
nership or joint venture75 .
Two basic constructions can result from the wording allegedly made in the
contract. One, that the terms of support are similar to a husband and wife
relationship and are governed by the CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800 and 4801 (West 1976)
by analogy. Second, if pure contract theory is employed the phrase "support for
the rest of her life" might mean just that. Since there is no valid relationship
existing, as the parties so acknowledged, the argument could be made that since
no formal end could come about, the phrase constituted a clause in the contract
that stood with other clauses. The argument could be made that it is unreason-
able and beyond the expectations of the parties that such a clause would be
made; however, putting yourself in the position of the non-working spouse,
giving up a potential career in the entertainment industry, it could be reason-
ably intended that whether or not the relationship continued support would still
be due and owing. The rationale for such a provision would be a security clause
for the nonworking spouse.
71. This being so because there appears to be an agreement existing that
covers the basis of a property division.
72. Trutalli v. Meraviglia, 215 Cal. 698, 12 P.2d 430 (1932). Numerous other
cases have upheld enforcement of agreements between non-marital partners in
factual settings similar to the Marvin agreements. See, In Re Marriage of Foster,
42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1974); Weak v. Weak, 202 Cal. App. 2d 632,
21 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1962); Padilla v. Padilla, 38 Cal. App. 2d 319, 100 P.2d 1093 (1940).
73. Hill v. Estate of Westbrook, 95 Cal. App. 2d 599, 213 P.2d 727 (1950),
Updeck v. Samuel, 123 Cal. App. 2d 264, 266 P.2d 822 (1954).
74. In this case "damages" resulting therefrom are covered by the provi-
sions for ownership of property and support in the contract.
75. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660,665,557 P.2d 106, 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815,
819 (1977).
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As Corbin states: 7
6
[a]greement. . .mean(s) the expression of two or more persons re-
specting a subject matter of a kind that in the past has stimulated
official action of the part of organized society. . .an agreement con-
sists of mutual expressions; it does not consist of harmonious inten-
tions or state of mind. It may well be that intentions and states of mind
are themselves nothing but chemical reactions or electrical discharges
in some part of the nervous system. It may be that some day we may
be able to observe a state of mind in the same way that we observe
chemical processes and electrical discharges. At present, however,
what we observe for judical purpose is the conduct of the parties. We
observe this conduct and we describe it as the expression of a state of
mind. It is by the conduct of two parties, by their bodily manifesta-
tions, that we must determine the existence of what is called agree-
ment. . . .This is what is meant by mutual assent.
Thus, the Court is faced with the task of observing the parties
and ascertaining whether such a contract concerning the rights
of the two non-marital partners exists. However, what standard
will the courts use to ascertain such responsibilities between the
parties? The fact that cohabitation exists between the parties
cannot be such a basis. The principle was elucidated in Marvin
when the Court stated that "agreements between non-marital
partners fail... to the extent that they rest upon meretricious
sexual services7 7". Therefore, more must be shown. How, then,
does the Court decide? What type of relationship must seem to
exist before relief can be granted?
It is obvious that such a standard must comply with a social
policy that defines the limit to which such an implied-in-fact
contract could arise.
Marvin implies that such a contract will result in equitable
distribution of the property and also that the holding in Vallera
imputing a non-equitable position to the relationship was er-
roneous78.
Therefore, we return to the definition of the scope of equity
that will establish such an implied-in-fact contract for distribu-
tion of the property acquired during the relationship. Noting
that Marvin's basic theory is in favor of equitable division, the
logical step is again missing as a result of dismissing the Family
76. 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 9, at 20 (1963).
77. See note 73, supra.
78. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660,676,557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815,826
(1977).
Law Act. If the Court adopts the narrow view with respect to
contracts for particular pieces of property, one spouse might
necessarily be denied a truly equitable division. On the other
hand, if a broad construction is adopted, providing those cou-
ples who have demonstrated an intent to contribute to the pres-
ervation of the relationship with the rights and duties of those
married couples under the Family Law Act, a truly equitable
split of the property would be accomplished.
Inasmuch as the Marvin Court views the parties as "not guil-
ty" they may appeal to equity for equal treatment under the law.
Thus, when a non-married party accustomed to support
throughout the "relationship" moves for alimony as part of the
property division, should not the court grant such based on the
implied contract? Note that leaving the parties at the status quo
is not accomplished by just an equal division of the property. It
can easily be proved and stated that a spouse who has given up a
full time or part time working career has given up the potential
for individual development in terms of working skills as a part
of the "consideration package"7 9.
Imposed upon this consideration is the issue that if a court
does allow such support and division, is a party holding an
express contract that did not contemplate a broader range of
remedial devices precluded from extending his division of prop-
erty, thus putting the persons with no express agreement in the
more favorable position?
The Use of the Remedy of Quantum Meruit
In The Equitable Division of Property
In Non-Marital Relationships
In addition to its remedies of express and implied contract,
the Court in Marvin v. Marvin8" suggests the use of the doctrine
of quantum meruit as a remedial device "when warranted by
the facts of the case" 81.
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 75 (1973) ....
(1) To constitute consideration, a performance or a return promise
must be bargained for.(2) A performance or return promise is bargained for if it is sought by
the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the
promissee in exchange for that promise.(3) The performance may consist of
(a) an act other than a promise, or(b) a forbearance, or(c) the creation, modification, or destruction of a legal relation.(4) The performance or return promise may be given to the promisor
or to some other person. It may be given by the promisee or by
some other person.
80. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1977).
81. Id. at 665, 557 P.2d at 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
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The basic theory of the remedy is restitution, the purpose of
which is the restoration of the "injured party"82 to the same
position as was occupied by him before the contract was made,
without attempting to compensate him for consequential
harms. The means to this end is a judgment for the equivalent in
money of any performance rendered by the plaintiff and re-
ceived by the defendant.83
The principle is that one who has rendered services under a
contract with another, but who has been "wrongly" 84 dis-
charged or otherwise prevented from fully performing its terms
and conditions as to earn the agreed compensation, may regard
the contract as terminated and get judgment for the reasonable
value of all that the defendant has received in performance of
the contract.85
The question then presented is how the remedy should be
used. Should it be a substitute for support as was previously one
of its functions or should it be used in conjunction with the other
theories of distribution espoused by the Marvin Court--express
and implied contract.
The scope of application of the remedy will, to a large extent,
create a balance between marital and non-marital relationships
or create situations in which the non-marital relationship could
gain an advantage over that of the married relationship.
In prior case law86 the doctrine of quantum meruit was used
effectively as a substitute for support rights for the putative
spouse. The Court in Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich87 , established
the rule that a putative spouse could recover in quasi-contract
for services rendered/contributed during the putative marriage
82. The term "injured party" is purely contract language which when inter-
jected into the family law setting has no meaning since the basic policy ex-
pressed throughout the Family Law Act is the principle of no-guilt between the
parties. Also, see note 18, supra.
83. 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 1102 at 548 (1963).
84. The term "wrongful" is used in the same sense as "injured party." See
notes 19 and 82, supra.
85. 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 1109 at 582-3 (1963).
86. Under an express contract the terms and conditions would be self-
explanatory; under an implied-in-fact contract, the court by looking at the
action of the parties would take into consideration the contribution by one or
both of the parties in the terms of the implied contract.
87. Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich, 88 Cal. App. 2d 708, 200 P.2d 49 (1948).
because failure to do so would result in unjust enrichment upon
the husband.88
On the other hand, California had at the time of the Laz-
zarevich decision, by an overwhelming weight of authority, de-
nied a putative spouse the right to recover alimony or spousal
support. 9
With the enactment of Civil Code Section 445590 the putative
spouse is entitled, in addition to an equal distribution of the
property, to support if the court deems it just and appropriate.
Thus, the need for quantum meruit as an equitable remedy has
been seen by many authors to be effectively precluded with
respect to putative marriage.9 1
However, since the Court in Marvin does not focus upon the
distinction of "meretricious-putative" 92, quantum meruit could
be seen as a substitute for support after dissolution as an addi-
tion to the division of the property.
Once again we must return to our basic social policy argu-
ment-whether a narrow approach will be taken in the interpre-
tation of the family relationship context or whether a broad
view will be taken. If the narrow approach is taken, the utiliza-
tion of the theory of quantum meruit could very well be looked
upon as a separate remedy for support after distribution of the
particular property is accomplished.
On the other hand, if a broad view is taken, quantum meruit
would, in the construction of implied-in-fact contracts, be a part
of the total scope of equitable relief in the establishment of
equality of division of property between the parties involved.
With respect to an express contract that the parties have
made, quantum meruit could be awarded for support to either
party in the form of compensation for services to the communi-
88. Id. at 715, 200 P.2d at 53.
89. Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 9 Cal. 2d 95, 69 P.2d 845, (1937); Millar v.
Millar, 175 Cal. 797, 167 P. 394 (1917); Middlecoff v. Middlecoff, 171 Cal. App. 2d
286, 340 P.2d 331 (1959). "Alimony" was the word commonly used prior to the
enactment of the Family Law Act. 1700 CAL. STATS. § 7 (1951 repealed 1969.) The
word "support" is now generally used to refer to support of both spouse and
children. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 4351, 4357, 4801 (West Supp. 1977).
90. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4455 (West Supp. 1977).
91. Luther and Luther, Support and Property Rights of the Putative
Spouse, 24 HASTINGS L. REV. 311, 325 (1973). The authors relying upon the Report
of the Governor's Commission on the Family, the legislative intent behind the
Family Law Act, and basic equitable considerations came to the conclusion that
Section 4455 was intended to supercede the quantum meruit remedy formerly
available to a putative spouse.
92. See note 5, supra.
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ty interest, thereby insuring a parity between a marital and non-
marital relationship and a uniform equitable division.
A second construction of the use of quantum meruit recovery
could be seen as a "piggy-back" remedy to accompany relief
obtained as a result of distribution under the theories of express
or implied contract.9 3
The wording that the Court employs does not really give a
clear indication as to the purported scope of the remedy. The
Court does point out that the domestic services of a cook, house-
keeper, and homemakers have value. 94 The issue of compensa-
tion95 for domestic services 96 rendered during a non-marital re-
lationship was first addressed in Vallera v. Vallera.97 There the
majority of the court decided that service could not be included
in the term "funds" with respect to contribution to the acquisi-
tion of property.9 8 Mr. Justice Curtis in his dissent9 9 in Vallera
criticized the majority for disallowing the rendition of domestic
93. Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 9 Cal. 2d 95, 100, 69 P.2d 845, 848 (1937).
Under a quasi-contract.theory it was held that, where no "marital" property has
been jointly accumulated, -a bona fide putative spouse may recover the rea-
sonable value of her services over and above the value of the support and
maintenance furnished by the other party.
Since it could be construed that under an implied agreement the terms of the
property division and the terms of support and maintenance would be covered,
the remedy in quantum meruit would be a "bonus" peculiar to the non-marital
relationship.
If used alone in the instance where no property has accumulated during the
marriage, the non-marital spouse has an advantage over the 'validly married
spouse; if there is property accumulated during the relationship, the implied
contract would govern distribution and support and maintenance. The rationale
behind quantum meruit recovery would remain .the same--being reimbursed
for services rendered to another-and a logical and persuasive argument could
be made in support thereof.
94. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660,677,557 P.2d 106, 117, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815,
826 (1977). Moreover, the value of a spouse's domestic services rendered can be
readily ascertained by pricing the amount of money that one would need to hire
a worker to perform such services over the specified time period.
95. In an express contract if a "services rendered" clause was not included,
the court could reasonably "fill in" the term and give effect to the contract. With
respect to implied contracts, the term of services rendered could easily be
interpreted by a Court to be a term within the contemplation of the parties.
96. The term "domestic services" refers to those services that are essential
to the maintenance and preservation of a household. Included are services of a
cook, homemaker, housekeeper, etc.
97. 21 Cal. 2d 681, 134 P.2d 761 (1943).
98. Id. at 685, 134 P.2d at 763.
99. Id.
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services to be included in the concept "contribution of funds"
that would entitle the non-working spouse to share equally in
the division of the property, because she contributed to its ac-
quisition. In his dissent in Keene v. Keene'00 , Mr. Justice Peters
finds contribution of domestic services as meeting the require-
ment of contribution of funds that assist in the acquisition of
property. He states the major issue as whether the term "funds"
as used in Vallera was intended to include extramarital services
as well as money and negotiable paper. The majority in Keene
did not equate the two, stating that the "common everyday
meaning includes cash and negotiable paper and property of
value which may be converted into cash, thus excluding serv-
ices."'10  However, as Mr. Justice Peters points out the two cases
cited by Mr. Chief Justice Traynor in Vallera make it clear that
as used in that quotation the term was to include services as well
as money or tangible property. 10 2
However, just as the argument was proposed that services are
included in the words "funds" in the sense of contribution to
property, so can an argument be made extending the point that
if domestic services have a value and that such domestic serv-
ices are conferring a benefit upon the other party, then relief by
way of quantum meruit can be sustained independent of relief
granted with respect to the division of property if the express or
implied contract can be based upon independent consideration.
Therefore, it is conceivable that one party could recover a
settlement for an equal division of the property under the
theory of express or implied-in-fact contract and at the same
time receive compensation for services rendered over and be-
yond the allocation to be made for support. This situation could
become a reality for the simple reason that the non-marital
parties are supposedly contracting as individuals. Con-
sideration for the implied or express agreement could be
severed from the consideration for compensation for services
rendered. For example, in the case at hand, the possibility that
the plaintiff's contract would have been upheld based upon her
giving up a career as a singer, would be legal detriment enough
to support a foundation of consideration. 10 3 So too, the working
100. 57 Cal. 2d 657, 672, 371 P.2d 329, 338, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593, 602 (1962).
101. Id. at 663, 371 P.2d at 332, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 596.
102. Hayworth v. Williams, 102 Tex. 308, 116 S.W. 43 (1901). The "funds"
contributed were services alone; and Delamour v. Roger, 7 La. Ann. 152, here
the term "funds" was used in reference to a situation where services and money
were both contributed.
103. See note 79, supra.
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non-marital partner who contributes his 10 4 earnings to the rela-
tionship, thus recovering an equal division of the property,
could then establish the claim of quantum meruit for domestic
services rendered to the other spouse, contending that the other
spouse was unjustly enriched by his domestic services. The
claim would be based upon the fact that if he did not perform
those services money would have had to have been expended to
acquire such services in the marketplace.
But query whether the parties ever intended such a remedy
or, moreover, whether in the absence of the situation where
acquisition of property is concerned, one party or the other has
been unjustly enriched. Domestic services contributed to the
relationship would logically tend to benefit the relationship as a
whole, not one party in particular.
To make matters more complex, the other spouse not alleging
recovery in quantum meruit could counter with the argument
that both parties contributed domestic services, therefore he
would pray to the court for similar recovery.
If such a case would be sustained, then the implications re-
garding a statutorily valid marriage would be effected. The
marital dissolution procedure under the Family Law Act does
not provide for such relief in quantum meruit. Thus, the ruling
favoring a quantum meruit recovery for services rendered
would work in favor of the non-marital relationship. Conse-
quently, based upon the fundamental policy of granting equi-
table relief, such a result would be inequitable in that, in essence,
the legal spouse faced with dissolution would be at a legal disad-
vantage if the same result for recovery were not granted. 10 5
104. The masculine pronoun is used throughout this paper not in a connota-
tion of the male-female roles, but is used in a sexless connotation.
105. The situation in a dissolution of marriage would be that the Court
would divide the property according to CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1977)
and support and maintenance would be awarded under CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801
(West Supp. 1977). Moreover, the spouse who performed domestic services
throughout the relationship most probably would be denied recovery on the
theory that the marital contract did not contemplate such a recovery and that
the legislature having spoken with respect to the dissolution of valid marital
relationships, the Courts are thus precluded from granting such a remedy.
IV
ALTERNATIVE To MARVIN - REDEFINITION OF
EQUITABLE SCOPE WITH RESPECT To
NON-MARITAL RELATIONSHIPS
In assessing the present and potential problems of the Marvin
decision, one questions whether or not a more desirable solution
could be fostered and achieved. Indeed, the principles of the
Marvin decision did more to disrupt the current law than to
establish predictable guidelines by which parties could ascer-
tain their rights and obligations.
In an attempt by the Court to "cleanse" the Family Law Act of
such relationships, the Court has taken non-marital relation-
ships out of the family law context and has relocated them into
the world of contract law as if they were devoid of any "family
setting".
Moreover, the Court, in an area that is grounded upon social
policy considerations, refuses to define the social policy that has
influenced its decision.
A more equitable basis for the division of property would be
to utilize statutory language provided under the Family Law
Act'0 6 with regard to quasi-marital property. Such Court treat-
ment would serve as a guide to the legislature for revision of the
Civil Code to include non-marital relationships within the scope
of the family setting.
Taking as a given fact, as does the Marvin Court, that during
the past fifteen years there has been a substantial increase in
the number of couples living together without marrying' ° , the
social policy of the State must adapt itself to the changing trend.
Rather than looking at non-solemnized marriages as a signifi-
cant factor in the destruction of the recognized public policy to
foster and promote the institution of marriage, one should look
upon its recognition as tending to promote the concept of the
family and strengthen the institution of marriage. The State by
imposing the same rights and duties upon those living together
with regard to property division as those lawfully married,
would put an end to the advantageous position of the working
spouse in a non-marital relationship. For the parties to call upon
106. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 4000-5000 (West 1976).
107. "The 1970 census figures indicate that today perhaps eight times as
many couples are living together without being married as cohabitated ten
years ago." See, Comment, In Re Cary: A Judicial Recognition of Illicit
Cohabitation, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1226 (1974).
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the law for relief, they must submit to society's necessary impu-
tation of rights and duties.
A balancing of the interests must take place: the State's inter-
est as prescribed in the state's police power in promoting family
relationships and regulating the law with respect to such rela-
tionships weighed against the freedom of the individual to
adopt a lifestyle outside of the purview of the established com-
munity property framework. Under the general welfare provi-
sion, the state must put the interest of the whole above-that of
individual preference to conduct one's affairs outside that of the
accepted social guidelines.
One of the Family Law Act's principle policy guidelines is the
elimination of the concept of fault or guilt from consideration in
interpretation of the Act 0 8. The Marvin Court adopted this
philosophy and extended its application to persons who choose
to live outside the marital structure stating that they will not be
referred to as "sinful or guilty," but will be treated as individu-
als entitled to the equitable protections of the courts. Thus,
leaving the parties in the position where they stood prior to
entering into the relationship proves inequitable. As the Marvin
Court perceptively states "perpetuation of judicial rules which
result in an inequitable distribution accumulated during a non-
marital relationship is neither a just or an effective way of
carrying out that policy."
The Marvin Court's flaw is that it did not define its scope
when it proposed the remedies at the outset of its opinion. By
eliminating the Family Law Act from consideration in dealing
with non-marital relationships, the Court detached itself from
the Family Law setting and its equitable considerations from
which to analogize.
Also, the Marvin Court did not define a social policy to base
its decision upon. Clearly, the Court intimated that the Beck-
man approach with respect to the social policy of fostering and
promoting the solemnized institution of marriage was not an
equitable way to deal with the issue of non-marital relation-
ships. Thus, the Court should have stated a new policy of the
State in fostering family relationships, one not constrained with
108. See note 19, supra.
labels, but one to which the State imposes rights and duties
consistent with the rights and duties accorded solemnized mar-
riages under the Family Law Act.
Since the Court accepted the Cary premise that the Family
Law Act did away with the concept of "guilt" in a non-marital
relationship, nothing less than both equality in treatment and in
a spouse's rights to share in the community after dissolution
would seem equitable. Thereby, the Family Law Act, combined
with a recognition of the new social policy espoused above,
creates the scope in which the Court could function in a consis-
tent and predictable manner.
Therefore, the course of action the Court should adopt is as
follows:
1-Adopt as a threshhold test to determine whether the Court's
equitable jurisdiction comes into play with regard to non-marital
relationships - the "Community of Interest"'10 9 standard.
This would alleviate all the discussion and subjective determina-
tion of the rights of the parties upon the dissolution of the rela-
tionship;
2-After the threshhold test is met, establish a rebuttable presump-
tion'1 0 that the man and woman assumed the rights and duties of
a legal spouse with regard to property acquired during the rela-
tionship;
3-Apply equitable principles, utilizing the scope of Family Law Act
in the division of property.
In this context the wording of Civil Code Section 4452 of quasi-
marital property could be used in reference to such a distribution
under community property principles.
In summary, the Court by instituting a procedure in equity,
the scope of which is enunciated by the Family Law Act with
regard to property division, will accomplish the following:
1-unclog the Court's calendar with potential claims arising out of
supposed contract action;
2-provide an efficient and predictable solution to the problem of
property division with respect to non-marital partners;
109. The Community of Interest Standard is nothing more than a negative
definition recognizing a non-marital living arrangement. A Court would find a
Community of Interest existing in a relationship absent an overt, ostensible
intent to keep the property acquired during the non-marital relationship sepa-
rate and/or a conscious effort not to contribute services or funds to the commu-
nity.
110. The presumption referred to is conceived to be a presumption of law. 9
WIGMORF, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW, § 2491 at 288, (3rd ed. 1940). A rebuttable presumption is
defined as a rule of law laid down by the judge, which attaches to one eviden-
tiary fact certain procedural consequences as to the duty of production of other
evidence by the opponent.
It would be envisioned that if no sufficient evidence to the contrary [evidence
that an actual family relationship did not exist] was introduced, the Court
would proceed to the third step of the proposal, the guide to division.
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3-provide an equitable system which will encourage family rela-
tionships, now that each spouse is aware that his duties and
obligations are identical to that of a married person; and
4-provide the legislature with guidance to revise the statutory
treatment of non-marital partners.
John F. DellaGrotta

